Summit Stories: An Analysis of the June 12 US-DPRK Summit

President Donald J. Trump and Kim Jung-un sat face to face in an epochal summit on June 12, 2018, on Sentosa Island in Singapore. The two men showed obvious rapport as they talked, signed a joint statement, and even partook in some jovial unscripted moments between meetings.

Though they got along, the summit was not the end-all moment that Trump and his administration had wished for. However, it may not the statement which Trump signed , but the relationship he cultivated with Kim Jung-un that may lead to further progress on the peninsula.

The Joint Statement

The most tangible outcome of the Trump-Kim summit was the Joint Statement signed by the two leaders. Though Trump lauded the outcome of the summit, the wording and commitments outlined in the joint statement simply do not advance the denuclearization of North Korea.

The Joint Statement consisted of a few major points. Trump agreed to provide security guarantees while Kim “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (Joint Statement)[1]. The statement also laid out four main commitments as well, including reaffirmation of the Panmunjom Declaration, establishment of relations between America and North Korea, continuing efforts to build a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the repatriation of American remains from the Korean War.[2] Trump and Kim closed by agreeing to continuing diplomatic reaches in attempting to solve the nuclear issue (Joint Statement).

Trump, following the summit, has been a staunch defender of the statement. After returning stateside, Trump tweeted that there was no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea (Twitter). Even a week after signing the statement, Trump continued to praise it, insisting that the media was downplaying the positive aspects of the agreement because he signed it (Twitter; USA Today). The president has constantly pointed to the provision calling for the repatriation of American remains from the Korean War as an example of the “major concessions” he gained from North Korea at the summit.

While Trump’s laudatory remarks are not necessarily out of the ordinary for a president who is defending his most important foreign policy venture of his tenure, the statement itself has drawn much criticism from the expert community. Jenny Town, managing editor of 38North, said the statement had even less detail than previous agreements between North Korea and the United States. Scott Snyder, an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the statement, and the summit itself, did nothing to address the missile development, biological and chemical weapons, as well as the human rights situation in North Korea (PBS). Andrei Lankov said the agreement had zero practical value and that “North Korea will feel emboldened while the United States got nothing” (Financial Times). Finally, Stephen Haggard argued that the statement will be detrimental to American short- and long-term interests in the region, writing “we are no farther along after the summit than we were before it,” in reference to lacking detail about the future in the statement (NKNews).

The biggest failure of the statement is the lack of concrete measures and steps for moving forward on the denuclearization of North Korea. Heading into Singapore, Trump drew a tough line on ensuring the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) of North Korea at the summit. The statement, however, makes no reference to CVID. Trump and Kim also agreed to promote peace and continue diplomacy, but left the details out here as well. As Benjamin Habib wrote in The Conversation, “the omission of CVID from the joint statement is confirmation that North Korea under Kim Jung-un is never going to willingly denuclearize,” and the statement is most revealing in its omissions (The Conversation).

While it is easy to lambast the statement for lacking key structural support for the continued push to denuclearize North Korea, the statement represents a key historical victory. It showcases the ability of Pyongyang and Washington to hear and negotiate on critical security concerns and even reach an agreement on those issues. Also, the statement has ushered in a calm over the peninsula as North Korea has entered a long moratorium of missile and nuclear testing–though no testing does not mean they haven’t been working and advancing their nuclear program in other ways. Though vague and lacking, the statement will provide an essential grounding for future negotiations with North Korea moving forward.

Frenemies: Kim & Trump’s Relationship

(Image: Trump and Kim as they walk over to check out “The Beast.” Source: AP News)

Another key aspect of the summit was the ability for Kim Jung-un and Donald Trump to build rapport with each other. Either the summit would be confrontational and the world would slip right back into a fear of possible war or the two leaders would be able to cultivate a decent relationship which could pave the way for future negotiations. Thankfully, the latter occurred.

Trump and Kim shared some very interesting, unscripted moments together in front of the cameras. The two leaders shared smiles throughout the event, and both walked a slightly confident swagger following the closed door meeting (TIME). Possibly the most intriguing moment occurred when Trump showed off “The Beast”–the presidential limo–to the North Korean leader (Fox News). The two appeared friendly during the summit, and that likely will assist in continuing negotiations in the future; it is easier to negotiate with someone if you find something in common, even if they are your enemy.

Trump even had some very kind words to say about Kim following their closed sessions during the summit. The President described the relationship between them as a very special bond. At one point, Trump even attempted humor, joking about getting a perfect picture in which the leaders look thin (NY Times). Trump’s words, body language, and even overall demeanor during these unscripted moments offered the possibility to gauge the summit. They confirmed that the two leaders got along and were able to discuss key issues in a mild manner under tense pressure.

Conclusion

It has been two weeks since the summit and already we have seen some advancement on both sides of the 38th parallel. President Trump has made good on his security promise by pulling the plug on the joint military drills (Yonhap). North Korea has started to remove its anti-American propaganda from shops and other locations across the country (NKNews).

Both President Trump and Kim Jung-un won something in this summit. Trump’s biggest takeaway was political. He can present the summit as successful use of diplomacy during his first term. Trump also got Kim to cease missile and nuclear testing for an elongated period of time in 2018–North Korea has yet to test a missile or nuke as it attempts diplomatic outreach to many nations. Kim won political legitimacy. Moreover, he gained legitimacy as a nuclear weapons state. Though his most important goal, the rest of the world will not confer the same legitimacy on Kim, and most likely will refuse to acknowledge his new found legitimacy if Pyongyang refuses to act as a responsible power in the world. The outcomes of the summit are tricky to parse, as diplomacy is complex.

Assigning a winner and loser of the summit is a paltry practice. Kim Jung-un won the legitimacy he pursued for years; even if the summit had no tangible outcomes, Kim still would have gained such legitimacy. He also gained, in writing, security guarantees from a sitting U.S. president. Trump gained a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests which backed the peninsula away from the brink of war. Trump’s biggest loss is legitimizing North Korea while not pushing for concrete steps toward denuclearization. Legitimizing Kim’s nuclear weapons also presents a challenge for Kim: he must now act as a responsible nuclear power to continue to posses and grow his legitimacy.

Future negotiations with North Korea surrounding the nuclear issue will shift as Kim will see himself as a bona-fide nuclear power, threatening enough for the United States president to meet with him, This is not to say that future talks will be for naught. As with this summit, major talks tend to correspond with lulls in testing, and provide some short-term room for progress to be made. Now, all we have to do is tactically use the opening created by the summit and push for concrete progress.

Notes

[1] The “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jung-un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit” will be referenced as the “Joint Statement” in this post for brevity.

[2] For a copy of the Panmunjom Declaration, see “Full text of Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula” in The Straights Times.

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Creating a Path Toward Denuclearization

It has been a long, unplanned hiatus for this blog, not due the lack of news coming from the peninsula for sure. As we approach meeting time, the world watches both President Donald J. Trump and Chairman Kim Jung-un as they wake up in Singapore, counting down the hours till they meet face to face. As I cannot write something that has not been written before, below is a brief breakdown of a possible path Trump can pursue to set North Korea on a path toward denuclearization.

(Image: Trump and Kim Jung-un. Source: CNN)

A diplomatic uncertainty, full of twists and turns only a Trump White House could produce, has increased the already high stakes of next weeks U.S.-North Korea summit. Topics will mainly focus on the weapons programs in North Korea, with a strong push for “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” Another key focus will be a formal ending to the Korean War with the possible signing of a peace treaty. Trump, in order to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, can pursue three goals which will set North Korea on the path toward denuclearization and use the possibility of a formal peace treaty to bring Kim Jung-un into compliance.

First, Trump can pursue the safety of the North Korean nuclear program by pushing for strong updates to current North Korean nuclear testing and production sites. Such updates would ensure that nuclear waste is properly stored, proper measures for interacting with nuclear material are implemented, and ensure that any accident can be contained quickly. Adding such a strict, internationally mandated safety to the North Korean nuclear program ensures any inspections are thorough and provides structure to give the world a better understanding of the program. It also can ensure that the North Korean people themselves are less likely to become the victim in case of a major breakdown at any nuclear site in the country.

Second, Trump must push for enhanced transparency with regards to international reporting on North Korea’s nuclear program. This includes installing a strong structure for and stipulations on North Korea’s own reporting of its nuclear program. As David Sanger and Willam Broad reported in the New York Times, Pyongyang has hidden vast amounts of data on its nuclear program for decades—American intelligence agencies cannot even agree on how many weapons Kim possess. This means any strong transparency measures will also have to include a strong inspection regime to ensure compliance with implemented measures and the accuracy of North Korean reports. Violations or discrepancies within North Korea’s reports must then be investigated and punished appropriately; a stronger understanding of the capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear program greatly enhances the ability to verify any steps taken toward denuclearization.

Finally, Trump should push for the destruction of known nuclear sites such as Yongbyon in order to build upon the North’s actions at Punggye-ri while also greatly reducing North Korea’s capabilities to expand its arsenal. To prevent shallow gestures, international experts need to be able to attend and verify the destruction of such sites, and Pyongyang should face penalties if any site is not irreversibly destroyed. Though there are many unknown nuclear sites in North Korea, destroying the ones already known cripples Kim’s ability to build more weapons. A panel of interested nations—Russia, America, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and China—should convene to discuss the future of any sites discovered. Rewards should be granted if Pyongyang volunteers site information and follows through on its complete destruction.

A formal peace treaty should not be signed unless Kim Jung-U.N. is willing to commit to all of these steps, ensuring that he is making good on his promise to pursue denuclearization. Providing North Korea with the security assurances that come with a formal treaty without pressing for concrete steps toward denuclearization ensures that Kim is free to cheat on any deal, all while gaining concessions and legitimacy in the domestic and international arenas. Trump also needs to think about the future and ensure that strong measures are ready to be implemented should Pyongyang cheat on the deal. America simply cannot give Kim concessions without gaining concrete steps toward denuclearization.

If Trump can secure all three of these commitments from Kim, he will walk away having accomplished more than previous presidents have on the North Korea issue. However tantalizing, he must avoid giving away security guarantees for grand promises and instead focus on setting North Korea down the road toward denuclearization. With the hype and pressure surrounding the summit, Trump must think in terms of substance while refusing to fall for North Korea’s grand promises of peace and denuclearization that Pyongyang carefully crafts for their benefit.

Corrections: June 11, 2018

Typographical changes to make the post easier to read.

Breaking News: Sweeping Olympic Deal

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(Image: The Korean Unification Flag. Source: Sarago)[1]

South and North Korea have been working on a dialogue for weeks, which mainly has focused on Olympic participation of North Korea. (These talks are subject to my post in progress, outlining a few major stories as I work my way back into publishing on this site.) Today, these talks have reached a broad deal which establishes a sweeping precedent for inter-Korean sports relations moving forward.

In Pyeongchang, the two Koreas will march under one flag (Wall Street Journal), the Unified Korea flag which shows an undivided peninsula in blue on a white background (Yonhap). However, the deal does not stop there. In Women’s Ice Hockey, the two Koreas will field a unified team; North Korea is set to send 230 member cheering squad and a 30 taekwondo demonstration team; and the North promised to send a 150 member delegation to the Paralympics in March (Yonhap).

The deal is a milestone in inter-Korean sports relations, though it may face some backlash. South Korean athletes have, in the past, balked at the idea of a unified team that places parity with North Korea over the hard work of South Korean athletes (New York Times). The deal, in South Korean political circles, is being argued as a start to thawing relations with North Korea. It also may enhance security around and during the Olympics as North Korea now has a stake in the outcome.

Notes

[1] This source is in Japanese and I have simply pulled the image.

A Leap With Limitations: North Korea’s November 29 Missile Launch

On November 29, North Korea launched a missile from Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province. After flying to an altitude of 2,800 miles, the missile splashed down in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (CNN; USA Today). The test broke a hiatus that lasted over two months, escalating tensions on the peninsula in the months leading up to the Olympic Games in South Korea. Not only was the test a break in the brief respite in testing, it marked a massive improvement in North Korea’s arsenal. Several key questions arise from the test. 1) What capabilities does the new missile add to North Korea’s program? And should we be scared of those new abilities? 2) How does the test alter the way we respond to North Korean provocations? 3) Are we inching closer and closer to a war on the peninsula?

How Does the New Missile Enhance Pyongyang’s Abilities?

The missile tested on November 29 was a Hwangsong-15 type Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the largest and longest reaching missile in North Korea’s arsenal. David Wright, co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, estimated that the missile, flown on a more standard trajectory, has an estimated range of 13,000km (8,100 miles)[Union of Concerned Scientists]. Analysts have cautioned, however, that the missile was most likely tested with a reduced payload to exaggerate its overall capabilities. Some estimates place the range of the operational missile, carrying a 500kg payload, to be around 8,300km (38 North).

Despite its range, some other key aspects of the missile differentiate it from the rest of North Korea’s arsenal. Compared to the Hwangsong-14, the ICBM North Korea tested in July, the Hwasong-15 is bigger, has more engines, and features a guidance system which is simpler and more effective than previous variations on other North Korean missiles (38North). Another key aspect of the missile is the Hwasong-15’s BMD defenses. The Hwasong-15 has the capability to carry a wide variety of simple decoys, pieces used to fool interceptors into hitting the wrong target. Several experts agree that the current state of American Ballistic Missile Defense, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System or GMD, is not capable enough to be relied on in the event that an operational Hwasong-15 is launched against the country (The National Interest). Technologically, the missile not only is a step up for Pyongyang, it showcases that North Korea has mastered a wide variety of technological aspects for their ICBM program, providing them with a stronger ability to strike the United States mainland and get through the web of American missile defense. It’s a scary leap forward indeed.

The Hwasong-15 is the technological leap forward the international community has been fearing for some time. Not only does the missile appear more accurate and reliable than other North Korean missiles, it also has the theoretical ability to carry a nuclear warhead to the United States mainland, even if the operational length of the missile is shorter than test analysis shows. North Korea may now turn its focus to improving the Hwasong-15 as well as shrinking its nuclear weapons to fulfill its penultimate goal: having the ability to strike the United States mainland with a reliable nuclear-tipped ICBM.

Running out of Options: How Do We Respond in the Age of the ICBM?

International reactions to Pyongyang’s test were strong, yet not strong enough to provoke. Marked with shows of strength and tough diplomacy, reactions have centered on one goal: showcasing strong forces and alliances as a method of deterrence. However strong they were, the responses also needed an element of tempered diplomatic maneuvering to avoid exacerbating the situation.

While moving through the typical South Korean bureaucratic channels–Moon Jae-in called an emergency meeting of the National Security Council as the military worked to assess and respond to the test–Seoul launched a precision strike missile within 6 minutes of the North Korean test. Seoul’s response is striking for many reasons. South Korea had some intelligence pointing to a possible launch; it involved cooperation between the Army, Air Force, and Navy; and it “offer[ed] potent operational evidence of parts of its Kill Chain preemptive strike system and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan,” two parts of South Korea’s defense strategy (The Diplomat). Moon Jae-in also worked the diplomatic reams of the crisis. In a phone call with President Trump, the two agreed to discuss further measures to punish North Korea for the test (Reuters).

While South Korea’s response was one of measured strength and cooperative diplomacy, the United States took a more hawkish stance. American Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, at an emergency meeting of the Security Council, called on nations to isolate Pyongyang by cutting all ties with North Korea, while also arguing that the test brings the peninsula closer to war (TIME). Currently, 24 nations have relations with North Korea and there are 47 North Korean diplomatic missions scattered throughout the world (CNN). However, many nations have expelled North Korean diplomats for a slew of reasons. Following its September nuclear test, 6 nations–Spain, Kuwait, Peru, Mexico, Egypt, and the Philippines–sent North Korean diplomats packing while Uganda cut all military ties in May of 2016 (Reuters). Malaysia also expelled its North Korean Ambassador following the assassination of Kim Jung-nam earlier this year (The Guardian). As North Korea continues to push for more advanced weapons and eliminates perceived threats to Kim Jung-un by any means, more nations may choose to cut ties with North Korea, though some will likely stay to act as mitigators between North Korea and the outside world.

41596479_401(Image Source: The DW)

President Trump, who has been a vocal critic of Kim Jung-un since ascending to the White House, has also lashed his teeth following the test. On Twitter, Trump said “the situation will be handled,” and called for tougher sanctions on the regime (Twitter). Outside of calling for political actions, Trump has lashed out at Pyongyang’s leader, calling Kim Jung-un a slew of names including “Little Rocket Man” (Twitter), and “Sick Puppy” (Politico). Even before his presidency, Trump has been very vocal, and often times bellicose, in criticising the North Korean regime (CNN). Despite the vitriolic rhetoric by Trump, he has hinted at the possibility of meeting with Kim Jung-un, but has said the meeting would have to happen under the right circumstances (BBC).

China, North Korea’s greatest ally in the world, demurred the test, expressing “grave concern and opposition” (CNBC). Despite having strong reservations about the nuclear and missile program, China still stands by North Korea. As American and South Korean forces conducted annual drills, China’s Air Force flew on routes and in areas it has never flown over the East and Yellow Seas, a warning to Trump against provoking Pyongyang (Forbes). The drills highlight a grave possibility if hostilities resume: China may come to the aid of North Korea. As if the possibility of Chinese intervention in a resumed Korean conflict weren’t enough to raise hairs, a Chinese provincial newspaper ran a full-page advisory giving advice to citizens called “General Knowledge about Nuclear Weapons and Protection.” The advisory ran cartoons about how to act in a nuclear attack, eventually forcing the paper to calm citizens worries (Washington Post).

Global reaction to the test was measured not in its strength or creativity in calls to action. Rather, the reactions and policy proposals following Pyongyang’s test showcased just how divided the world is on the issue. Conflicting issues will continue to mire any chance of success in bringing North Korea to the discussion table.

The North Korean security issue is a complex one, requiring a combination of hard-line isolation and more tactful diplomacy to resolve. However, there seems to be no clear path forward; diplomatic actions are likely to be cheated by Pyongyang and more aggressive actions will exacerbate tensions. The most effective actions, however, are the ones taken in unison. Nations who have a major stake in the situation–America, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan to name a few–need to unify in a detailed approach leveling carrots and sticks toward Pyongyang. Without a clear, unified path forward, North Korea will continue to test as a way to split world powers and maintain a system of global order which favors continuing nuclear and ballistic missile tests as a way for North Korea to survive and get what it desires.

Are we Inching Closer to the Edge?: The Possibility of War on the Peninsula

Following every new advancement in Pyongyang’s capabilities, the world ponders the effects of resumed conflict on the peninsula, and following this test was no different. Barry Posen, an MIT political science professor, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times speculating the potential costs of a war on the Korean Peninsula (New York Times). American Senator Tammy Duckworth commented that the majority of the American public doesn’t know exactly how close to war the situation really is (Vox).

North Korea, for its part, has not been working to squash such fears. After a rhetorical tit-for-tat, a North Korean spokesman was quoted as saying that “these confrontational warmongering remarks cannot be interpreted in any other way but as a warning to us to be prepared for a war on the Korean Peninsula,” (Newsweek). An article in the Korean Central News Agency strongly demurred the recent actions by the Americans, calling the outbreak of war “an established fact” (KCNA).[1] Such comments have done nothing but strengthened the idea that war is inevitable, but is it really?

Despite the highly tense rhetoric, war is still far from an established fact. Barry Posden, in The New York Times, writes that “the complexity, risks and costs of a military strike against North Korea are too high.” He reaches this conclusion by citing that America would have to make several unobvious maneuvers, a task with a high chance of failure. Also, North Korea would, despite the success of a preemptive attack, have a chance to respond, and “the detonation of even a small number of nuclear weapons in North Korea would produce hellish results” (New York Times).

Another key reason war is further from resumption is the rationality behind North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (Wall Street Journal). Kim Jung-un views the program as a way to ensure his security as a global leader and understands that war would most likely lead to his unseating. Those around him, though they are unable to rein in Kim, also face a scenario of loss of power if hostilities resume.[2]

As the situation stands today, we are no closer to war than we were a few days or months ago. The most realistic chance of war comes from the high likelihood of a miscalculation by either Trump or Kim in either rhetoric or action. Maintenance of the status-quo along with tough sanctions and pressure, though a flawed and possibly resultless strategy, continues to be the best of the worst case on the peninsula. It is only through a mix of pressure and creative diplomacy, backed by the entire international community, presents the greatest opportunity to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table, though it still does not guarantee that negotiation will lead Pyongyang to a freeze.

Notes:

[1] Source is from North Korean state media and therefore will not be linked to in this post. However, the cited Newsweek, article offers a good analysis of North Korea’s recent rhetoric, including the KCNA article.

[2] David Rothkopf, a senior fellow at SIAS, offers more insight into why a war on the peninsula is not as close as the media makes it seem. His basic framework is similar to the one I attempted to create, though his wonderful piece in the Chicago Tribune hones in on the possibilities on the Korean peninsula in more focused and detail tone than my own. I highly recommend his piece: David Rothkopf, “Here’s how the North Korea nuclear standoff will end,” Chicago Tribune, December 7, 2017. (This is today’s Daily Reading.)

Corrections:

12/8: A previous version of this article said that the precision test was performed after Moon Jae-in called a meeting of the National Security Council, when in fact the two happened fairly close to each other.

Daily Update: November 28

South Korea

Politics: President Park’s trial resumed after a 42-day hiatus following her entire legal team resigning due to the perceived politicization of the proceedings. The accused, however, refused to show up for the resumption of her trail, leading the lead judge to threaten to try Park in absentia, saying that it will be difficult to force her to show up due to her status as ex-president (Choson Ilbo). After refusing to show for the second day, the presiding judge, Honorable Kim Se-yoon, followed through on his threats, announcing that the rest of the trail would continue in her absence (HanKyoreh). Park has continually protested the proceedings and her absence hinders her right to self-defense.

Moon Jae-in has also been making some political moves. On November 26, Moon promoted Han Byung-do, a political affairs secretary, to the position of Senior Secretary for Political Affairs, a position opened by the departure of Jun Byung-hun who is in the midst of a bribery investigation (Yonhap). On the appointment, Presidential Spokesman Park Soo-hyun said, “Han is considered to be fit for communications with the National Assembly considering his experience as a lawmaker” (Korea Times). Han said that he “feel[s] a heavy responsibility” in taking the job (Yonhap). Other moves by Moon include calling for swift reform to regulations to promote growth (Yonhap) and a pledge to use all his paid vacation as a way to showcase work-life balance and change the work culture in Korea (Korea Times).

Culture: Including this simply because she is my favorite solo singer: Taeyon, a member of the girl group “Girl’s Generation,” was involved in a multi-car accident, though she appears to be resting at her home. SM Entertainment has promised to do its best in resolving the issue (Korea Herald). All others involved in the accident were sent to the hospital with minor injuries (Yonhap).

Finally, plastic surgery is a common commodity in South Korea, drawing some tourists from all over the world. However, there is one place where plastic surgery ads will start to vanish: the subway. Seoul Metro will ban its advertising agencies from buying plastic surgery ads, eliminating plastic surgery ads from metro stations by 2022 (Korea Times). Seoul Metro also has plans to not renew contracts for plastic surgery ads when they expire (Choson Ilbo).

North Korea

North Korea fired another ballistic missile test at dawn on November 29. The missile flew 960km, reached an altitude of 4500km, and flew for 53 minutes before crashing into the sea off the coast of Japan (Korea Times). The launch was higher than any previous launch by North Korea.

Reactions to the test have been more in line with previous tests. President Moon Jae-in convened the Security Council to discuss the situation and said, he “strongly condemn North Korea for staging such reckless provocations” (Yonhap). President Trump remained more muted than in the past, simply saying that North Korea is an issue that will be addressed by the administration while leaving out details as to how he plans to address Pyongyang (NY Times). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council (Ashia Shimbun). The leaders have all contacted each other to discuss the situation as well. Currently, the response to the test is going through the typical reams of response, though a harsher response than normal may be in the works as the missile tested does have the theoretical ability to reach all of the United States.

One state taking the threat from North Korea seriously is Hawaii. In an effort to ensure the population of Hawaii is prepared, the state is adding a Cold War-era warning siren to its monthly attention alert tests. The alarm will sound for 50 seconds, take a brief pause, and then resume for another 50 seconds. Starting on December 1, the alarm will sound on the first business day of each month (Honolulu Star Advisor). The last time such sirens were used was around 1980 to counter the Russian threat of the Cold War. Hawaii is the first American state to take such drastic measures to ensure preparedness against the North Korean threat.

Read of the Day:

Coping with the inevitability of death is a key aspect of life. Many turn to religion, science, or a combination of both to explain what happens to our spirits and bodies when the lights go out. For North Koreans, however, theories surrounding death have evolved in a couple of interesting ways. The first is that citizens of North Korea are taught that they belong to a collective, immortal group; the party, leader, and people all share a common destiny and are therefore immortal. Second, in North Korea, political life is more important than physical life. Acts for the leaders will earn a person political immortality while subversive acts will cut a person’s political life short, even if they are still alive. Defector Park Ui-song takes on North Korea’s interesting culture surrounding death in a wonderful piece for NK News: Park Ui-song, “Ask a North Korean: Do People Talk About Life After Death in the DPRK?” NK News, November 16, 2017.

Daily Update: November 14

Seeing as today was a fairly busy day for me, I am going to do a decurtate rundown of the news from the Korean peninsula today.

Moon Jae-in on North Korea

In Manila, South Korean President Moon Jae-in offered a smoother path toward resolution of the North Korean issue while at a regional ASEAN forum. The president outlined a strategy in which “[the international community] may be able to discuss while leaving all options on the table.” Though Moon refused to answer if the American-South Korean joint military drills would be given a quietus in return for a North Korean freeze of its nuclear and missile program (Yonhap). At the same forum, Moon called the North Korean nuclear program too advanced to be quickly destroyed, but once a suspension was in effect that “negotiations could go on to pursue complete denuclearization” (Reuters). Moon has long been a champion of diplomatic resolutions to the North Korean issue, though he did reinforce that now is the time to apply pressure through sanctions until a suspension or freeze in North Korea’s programs made negotiations a possibility worth exploring.

Human Rights and the United Nations

A panel at the United Nations adopted a resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights abuses. The Third Committee, which oversees humanitarian issues, approved the text for the 13th year, though added stronger language in calling for a resolution to the issue (Korea Herald). Contributions to the text were made from 60 countries, including South Korea, and the full document was drafted by the European Union and Japan (Yonhap). In remarks to the committee following the adoption of the resolution, North Korea’s Ambassador to the United Nations Ja Song-nam said, “The draft resolution represents a product of the political and military confrontation plot and the conspiracy of the U.S. and other hostile forces to the DPRK,” echoing rhetoric previously used in North Korea’s demurring of United Nations resolutions targeting Pyongyang (Yonhap).

Spy Chiefs in Trouble

The prosecution investigating Choigate–President Park’s abuse of power scandal–detained ex-National Intelligence Service (NIS) chief Lee Byung-kee on charges relating to money given to Park from the NIS during his tenure. Other former NIS chiefs Nam Jae-joon and Lee Byung-ho are facing similar charges (Korea Times). The arrest of these three comes as the NIS is accused of a wide array of activities which includes spying on citizens, creating fake nude photos, creating fake online content, and swaying or downplaying TV opinion shows (Korea Herald). Though reform will be sluggish, there is already a plan to overhaul the structure of the agency (Donga Ilbo). Time will tell the success of any reform in the NIS, as true reform in the agency is bound to take a while.

Finally, Your Reading of the Day:

Moon Jae-in entered the office of President of South Korea with the image of being a dove on North Korea policy. In The Atlantic, S. Nathan Park writes that imagining Moon as a doveish liberal “is a lazy caricature” of the president. Moon’s actions and rhetoric certainly showcase a more hawkish approach to North Korea. In his piece, Park argues that Moon’s dual-track–sanctions and pressure followed by diplomacy in the right circumstances–is a key to Moon’s success and a possible resolution of the North Korean issue. Read Park’s take on Moon here: S. Nathan Park, “South Korea’s President May Be Just the Man to Solve the North Korea Crisis,” The Atlantic, July 18, 2017.

For a deeper dive into Moon’s North Korea strategy, see: Ruediger Frank, “President Moon’s North Korea Strategy,” The Diplomat, July 13, 2017. (This was orginially published on 38North.)

Daily Update: November 13

So, I am going to get back into the routine, finally! Here is the first Daily Update of many to come. And the North Korean round-up for the time I embarked on a bit longer than planned hiatus is coming, I promise.

South Korea

Politics: The world will enter a truce period as a resolution calling for an “Olympic Truce” started to circulate throughout the United Nations. With tensions between the two Koreas in a constant state of upheaval, the truce calls for the world to come together and use the games as a space to connect, no matter what is happening in capitals around the world (LA Times). In an impassioned speech to the General Assembly, Kim Yu-na, a champion South Korean figure skater and Ambassador to the PyeongChang games, said, “the goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity,” (Yonhap). She also spoke of the games’ role in promoting peace throughout the world (Around the Rings). The Olympic Truce for 2018 is, as it states in the resolution, to extend from 7 days before the start of the games until 7 days after the conclusion of the Paralympic games in March.

Amid the hustle and bustle of Donald Trump’s trip to Asia, South Korean president Moon Jae-in also made waves at the ASEAN summit in Vietnam. In meetings with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang on the sideline of the ASEAN summit, a vivid discussion on the need to normalize relations between China and South Korea ensued, following a joint statement released by the two nations on October 31 which called for the same goal (Korea Times). Moon also agreed to broader goals regarding the cooperation of ASEAN states with Korea. While reaffirming the role of ASEAN states in Korean foreign policy, Moon promised to raise South Korean trade with ASEAN to $200 billion per year by 2020, while also championing a “people-centered diplomacy” with the intranational organization (Korea Herald; Korea Times). Overall, Moon’s trip to the ASEAN summit provided the leader with two key victories: he was able to promote global cooperation within Asia, a key goal in the region, and he started the process of normalizing the soured Beijing-Seoul relationship.

Finally, the Baerun party, a splinter conservative party which was created in the wake of the Park scandal, chose Yoo Seong-min to be its leader (Korea Herald). Yoo was a presidential hopeful in the 2017 election and came to the party with the other 33 founding lawmakers. He will face tough opposition from the Liberty Korea Party, the other major conservative party in South Korea, during upcoming regional elections.

Economy: The government of South Korea and several of the companies who suffered losses after the shuttering of Kaesong have come to an agreement. The government will provide 66 billion won ($59 million) to over 100 companies who operated factories within the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Though many businesses fell the amount is not enough to cover their losses, they have accepted the deal (Joongang Ilbo). This recompense comes as the government has continued to dole out reparations to the companies who lost over 700 billion won after the complex unexpectedly shut its doors last year.

Culture: Hidden cameras are a huge issue facing the South Korean population, mainly women. Love motels, subway bathrooms, cell phones, and even in the home, women have fallen victim to recording on hidden devices. To combat the issue, the government has promised to step up campaigns to find the cameras. Currently, the Seoul Metropolitan government is running a program which hires citizens to find hidden cameras wherever they may hide. The Korea Times followed two such women as they worked their way through several stops to find and remove hidden cameras from public bathrooms on the subway. Their job, though not glitzy, is important as it assuages fears that somewhere, someone may be watching.

North Korea

It was a busy day on the DMZ, to say the least. First, a North Korean soldier defected across the heavily militarized border and walked into the Freedom House on the South Korean side of the border (NK News). While defecting, the soldier suffered a bullet wound to his shoulder, shot by his own troops; he was evacuated by a UN helicopter and is being treated at a hospital (Joongang Ilbo). He was unarmed at the time of the defection.

Where one succeeds, another failed. A 58-year-old, Lousiana man was captured trying to defect into North Korea by crossing the Civilian Control Line. He was attempting to enter North Korea for “political purposes,” according to reports. An investigation by the Army, secret services, and police is ongoing (Newsweek). The man, being only identified as “A” arrived in South Korea three days prior.

Readings of the Day

Moon Jae-in, as reported above, sought to put Korea on a path of “people-centered diplomacy” with ASEAN. In Project Syndicate, Moon writes that “Korea and ASEAN share a common philosophy that values people,” while also touting the positive changes ASEAN has presented to Korea over the past year. Read his take on why ASEAN and Korea need the people first philosophy outlined in ASEAN 2025: Moon Jae-in, “Toward a People-Centered ASEAN Community,” Project Syndicate, November 10, 2017.

Finally, a debate over the effectiveness of the South Korea-U.S. alliance has been critical to discourse on the peninsula. The key element: American troops deployed in South Korea. In the Asia Times, Andrew Salmon condenses the discussion into a brief article, articulating the main points of contention throughout this debate, asking the main question: Is is the Korea-American alliance worth it? Read his take on the state of the alliance: Andrew Salmon, “Could South Korea Abandon its Strained Alliance with the U.S.?” The Asia Times, November 10, 2017. To dive deeper into the debate, see also: Se-Wong Koo, “Is South Korea’s Alliance with the United States Worth It?” The New York Times, November 6, 2017.